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 Abstract 
The causal reasoning literature suggests that hypothesis testing will only include tests that support 
a particular hypothesis (confirmation bias), rather than distinguish between possible hypotheses 
(Wason, 1960; Mynatt, Daugherty, & Tweney, 1977; Klayman & Ha, 1987).  Self-generated 
hypotheses should elicit a stronger confirmation bias than other-generated hypotheses, possibly 
because the generation of a hypothesis requires an initial assessment of plausibility (Schunn & 
Klahr, 1993).  Plausibility is determined by considering a possible cause within a network of prior 
knowledge about the world (Koslowski, 1996).  Our study examines the testing of genuine 
explanations in non-emotion-laden, complex causal reasoning situations.  We predict that the 
source of the explanation (self or other) and presence of alternative explanations will influence 
ability to distinguish between two hypotheses.  Furthermore, we predict that the incorporation of 
prior knowledge into the hypothesis test will allow individuals to distinguish more successfully.  
Sixty subjects (F = 32, aged 18-22) completed a structured interview evaluating explanations that 
varied on number of explanations present and source of explanation.  Ability to distinguish 
between a target explanation and its complement (but not a genuine alternative) was shown to 
differ based on the source (self or other) of the target and whether an alternative was provided.  
Prior knowledge was only used when distinguishing between the target and a genuine alternative.  
In general, the use of a contrast or covariation test is the best predictor of ability to distinguish 
between two explanations. 
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Science About What Scientists Do: 
 
Distinguishing Between Explanations for Causal Events 
Scientists across all fields employ the same process when they try to explain phenomena 
– the process known as the “scientific method.”  A scientist generates a hypothesis about the 
causality of a particular factor; the hypothesis is subjected to tests; and, when the results of these 
tests are anomalous for the initial hypothesis, that factor is rejected as a cause, and a new 
hypothesis is generated and tested.  By integrating hypotheses with what is already known about 
the world, scientists develop theories on not just what causes a phenomena, but also how it is 
caused.  Non-scientists use the same method of reasoning about possible causes.  After 
identifying a covariate that is plausibly causal, most individuals want to go beyond mere 
covariation and find a theory or explanation that accounts for causation.  In our study, we 
investigate the ability of non-scientists to do what scientists do – to engage in scientific 
reasoning about genuine explanations for causal events.   
  
Operationalizing Causal Reasoning 
 Early causal reasoning paradigms arose in tandem with endeavors to understand the 
development of scientific reasoning in children.  Consistent with his formal-operational model, 
Piaget’s approach to causal reasoning was hypothetico-deductive, incorporating a basic 
understanding of cause and effect (as simple as, “If I cry, Mommy will give me what I want”).  
His initial causal tasks with children involved testing combinations of chemicals to find the 
components of a specific brew.  Either a particular combination yielded the desired result or it 
did not, and children were successful in determining the makeup of the target chemical (Inhelder 
& Piaget, 1958).  As in this task, the assignment of causation usually stems from systematic 
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analysis of covariation.  In another key covariation task, children had to differentiate between 
two possible hypotheses: that a light was turned on by one lever or by another.  If the child knew 
that the activation of both levers turned on the light, and the activation of only the first lever did 
not turn on the light, the child would infer that the second lever is responsible for turning on the 
light.  The covariation for the second lever is perfect, while the covariation for the first lever is 
flawed (Shultz & Mendelson, 1975).  
 Of course, covariation as evidence for causation is inherently problematic.  In many 
situations, reverse causality poses a strong potential confound.  Without a controlled experiment 
or time-sequence data, if A covaries with B, it is just as likely that A causes B as it is that B 
causes A.  Alternatively, there could be a third confounding factor, C, that covaries with both A 
and B and may be the actual cause for both.  The aforementioned studies included no 
consideration of such alternative hypotheses.  In Inhelder & Piaget, the resulting chemical could 
not have caused its components because the participants saw that the components existed before 
they created the result – thus, reverse causality was not called into question.  In Shultz & 
Mendelson, a third, potentially confounding hypothesis, that activation of both levers was 
necessary for turning on the light, was neither incorporated in the experiment nor considered by 
the children.  Overall, covariation is necessary for causality, but to engage in sound reasoning 
means to discriminate between covariations that are causal and those that are merely artifactual 
(Koslowski, 1996). 
 Determining whether a covariation is causal requires an understanding of the overarching 
theory linking the proposed cause to its effect.  An explanation for an event not only identifies 
the covariation but can explain why it is causal.  With this causal mechanism, covariations can be 
assessed for relative plausibility, and, where mechanism does not exist, completely implausible 
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covariations can be attributed to artifact and discarded (Brem & Rips, 2000).  When individuals 
were asked to determine which of two covariations was the cause for better gas mileage in a car, 
either the car being small or the car being red, causation was likely to be attributed to the “red” 
hypothesis when the experimenter provided mechanism (that the color red facilitates alertness in 
drivers, causing them to drive more efficiently) (Koslowski, 1996).  Experimenters presented this 
piece of information because it was not available to most participants based only on their prior 
knowledge or experience.  When an explanation is consistent with background information that 
individuals have about the world, mechanism is easier to determine, and therefore causality is 
easier to detect.  For example, natural selection as an explanation for speciation is consistent with 
information about plate tectonics and animal breeding.  Spontaneous generation, on the other 
hand, is not consistent with these concepts.  Furthermore, outside information that is consistent 
with the spontaneous generation hypothesis is vastly more difficult to obtain than it is for the 
natural selection hypothesis.  The natural selection hypothesis is therefore the more plausible 
explanation for speciation (Weber & Depew, 1995).  In all, when assessing the plausibility of 
any explanation, two types of information aside from covariation can be incorporated: results of 
a test that are consistent with one explanation but inconsistent with another; and information 
from the network of past experiences and knowledge that is consistent with the target hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis Testing and Rejection  
 When reasoning about multiple explanations, an initial assessment must be made to 
establish relative plausibility.  Which of the possible explanations is the most likely to be 
correct?  In hypothesis rejection, completely anomalous (undermining) information diminishes 
the plausibility of a particular explanation to practically (but not exactly) zero, and the 
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explanation is discarded.  The literature suggests that self-generated hypotheses are rated as more 
plausible than other-generated hypotheses.  This effect may arise because, when generating their 
own hypothesis, individuals perform systematic mental tests of spontaneously generated 
alternatives, rejecting numerous alternatives before settling on the one that they “generate.”  It 
also appears that other-generated hypotheses are tested more rigorously than self-generated, 
possibly due to the lack of spontaneous mental testing of those explanations (Schunn & Klahr, 
1993).  An explanation increases in plausibility as alternative explanations are discounted, so the 
explanation that is the most difficult to undermine is chosen as the most plausible explanation 
(Koehler & Harvey, 2004; Koslowski, 1996).     
 Many tasks operationalizing causation as covariation, such as those listed in the first 
section, have a limited hypothesis set that is small and uncomplicated.  The hypotheses are 
derived from multiple plausible, mutually exclusive factors, and, of these hypothetical causes, 
one hypothesis has perfect covariation with the result.  Therefore, if undermining evidence for 
any one factor arises, the appropriate response is rejection of that hypothesis.  This variety of 
study incorporates little accounting for mechanism or incorporation of anomalous (incongruent) 
evidence into a hypothesis.  Such studies provide information about reasoning in situations with 
a limited number of distinct, plausible hypotheses, but, in everyday life, causal inference often 
takes place in more complex arenas (Koslowski, 1996). 
In causal reasoning situations with greater ecological validity, an initial hypothesis serves 
as a working hypothesis or global theory that is broad and imprecise.  When incongruent data 
arises, this evidence can function to narrow a global theory down to a local hypothesis that 
accounts for anomalies.  For example, a person, having only ever seen a set of blue Encyclopedia 
Brittanicas, may hold the hypothesis, “All books are blue.”  Upon entering a library and viewing 
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other books, the person would modify the hypothesis to, “All encyclopedias are blue.”  If he then 
sees a set of red encyclopedias, the hypothesis would become, “All Encyclopedia Brittanicas are 
blue,” and so on (Koslowski, 1996).   
 The decision-making model grows in complexity when tests must be performed to 
differentiate between hypotheses.  In seeking evidence that leads to the rejection of hypotheses, 
the first step is to identify the properties of the stimuli that could covary with a phenomenon.  
The next step is to conduct tests that could undermine the hypotheses of the causality of each 
property.  Thus, information that is sought should ideally distinguish between hypotheses, rather 
than be consistent with more than one.  Most studies have shown that people move through 
hypotheses based on a global theory on the mechanism of how causation is taking place, 
consecutively undermining them until one non-rejected covariation stands alone (Koehler & 
Harvey, 2004).  However, when the overarching theory is incorrect, tests of hypotheses often fail 
to expose the accurate causal factor; repeated testing of a flawed theory without its eventual 
rejection will prohibit individuals from determining the true causal  
When previous studies have investigated hypothesis testing, good reasoning has been 
framed as seeking undermining evidence.  In one quintessential hypothesis testing study, 
participants were asked to identify the rule governing the sequence of numbers, “2, 4, 6.”  
Participants most frequently hypothesized that the rule was “increasing even numbers,” but 
failed to test sequences that, if they were consistent with the rule, would undermine the 
increasing evens theory.  In actuality, the rule was “any three increasing digits.”  Testing the 
sequence “8, 10, 12” both supports increasing evens and fails to distinguish between multiple 
possible rules.  Conversely, testing the sequence “7, 6, 5,” fails to undermine the increasing 
evens hypothesis (Wason, 1960).  Mynatt, Daugherty, & Tweney (1977) developed a computer-
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animated task to investigate the differential testing of hypotheses.  Participants overwhelmingly 
chose tests that supported their (incorrect) target hypothesis, and therefore failed to discard it.  
Nevertheless, working from their flawed global theory, individuals were unable to identify the 
appropriate local hypotheses to test.   
An important distinction exists between a test of an explanation and its results.  Klayman 
and Ha (Klayman & Ha, 1987) note that the results of a test are what ultimately distinguish or 
fail to distinguish between hypotheses.  For example, the results of the test “8, 10, 12” are 
congruent with both the target hypothesis and the experimenter’s rule, so that test is essentially 
meaningless for determining the correct rule.  However, had the experimenter’s rule been “any 
three numbers below 10” (and, for all the participants knew, it could have been), the test result 
would have been that it is inconsistent with the rule. This result would undermine the ascending 
evens hypothesis.  Good scientific thinking occurs only if that particular hypothesis is discarded 
and alternative hypotheses are tested sequentially.  However, the rule used in the study (“three 
increasing digits”) was contrived to elicit tests that were consistent with both the rule and the 
target hypothesis, so alternative hypotheses were rarely tested.  Nevertheless, because successful 
hypothesis testing is defined as seeking distinguishing evidence, participants in the Wason and 
Mynatt tasks were said to have engaged in what is known as confirmation bias. 
 
Confirmation Bias 
A large amount of disagreement exists over what, exactly, is confirmation bias.  Why is it 
said that no undermining evidence sought for one particular explanation in the Wason task?  
Many researchers claim that alternative explanations are not adequately perceived or considered.  
In the Wason task, only certain alternative hypotheses were undermined; most of the tested 
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sequences only supported the generated hypothesis, and many alternative hypotheses were left 
unexamined.  Others claim that alternative hypotheses are considered, but are quickly and often 
irrationally discounted as relatively implausible.  More debate exists over what happens (and 
ought to happen) when an individual is presented with undermining (or anomalous) evidence – 
information that is incongruent with the target hypothesis.  The evidence may be simply ignored, 
or there could be an attempt (often dubious) to reconcile the anomaly with the first hypothesis 
(Koslowski & Maqueda, 1993).   
Overall, confirmation bias implies a “marriage” to one particular hypothesis.  This 
dedication is especially apparent with self-generated hypotheses; other-generated hypotheses 
evoke more skepticism and thus are tested more rigorously (Schunn & Klahr, 1993).  In much of 
the available literature, when given the opportunity to test their hypothesis, people invariably 
only seek out information that will either support the target hypothesis or fail to distinguish 
between any possible hypotheses (Koslowski & Maqueda, 1993).  There are two types of valid 
alternatives to any explanation.  The first is a genuine alternative, which introduces another 
specific possible cause with causal elements that are independent from the original explanation.  
The second is a complementary alternative, which does not identify any specific causal elements, 
and can only be described imprecisely as “not the target explanation.”  Karmiloff-Smith’s studies 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1984) have shown that people prefer a flawed explanation over merely its 
complement, so confirmation bias may result from avoiding the discarding of a specific 
explanation for lack of a more plausible alternative.  Thus, our operational definition of 
confirmation bias is: a failure to take account of information that successfully distinguishes 
between two hypotheses. 
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Our Study 
 Where the causal reasoning literature focuses on the examination of covariation, we 
investigated the process behind evaluation of actual explanations for complex events.  In 
addition, by allowing for relatively unconstrained reasoning in this task, we were able to assess 
what people do spontaneously when engaging in scientific thinking.  In many tasks assessing 
reasoning about covariation, performance is treated as correct only when possibly relevant 
information is either limited by the participant to very few variables or completely excludes 
mechanism and corollary events.  In one classic study, children were asked to state which of two 
types of cakes (carrot or chocolate) causes the common cold (Kuhn, Amsel, & O'Loughlin, 
1988).  Without obvious mechanism or corollary event provided by the experimenter, the 
researchers treated as correct reasoning responses that were limited to the information that the 
experimenters provided, namely information about covariation.  When responses included a 
priori knowledge (such as previously acquired information about causal mechanism or corollary 
events), the participant was considered to have engaged in flawed reasoning.  In scientific 
reasoning, the incorporation of outside information in the form of mechanism or corollary events 
for a covariation is a fundamental step that leads to causal inference.  Our experiment allowed 
participants to choose the information that they believed to be pertinent from an unrestricted 
domain that included factors both presented by the experimenter and brought in from the 
participant’s prior knowledge.   
We examined confirmation bias in reasoning about explanations, rather than merely 
covariation, for events drawn from the natural and social sciences.  The event stimuli that we 
constructed did not elicit a strong emotional response – with events that are emotion-laden, it 
would be impossible to differentiate between judgment based on reasoning and judgment based 
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on emotion.  We gave participants free rein to seek information about explanations for events, 
and evaluated their ability to generate information that could, in principle, distinguish between 
two explanations, namely between the target explanation and either a genuine alternative or a 
complementary alternative.  Then we investigated which aspects of a piece of information made 
tendency to distinguish more likely.  These elements included the origin of explanations (self- or 
other-generated) and the number of explanations (one or two), as well as certain types of factors 
within a piece of evidence that are traditionally thought to be relevant to causal reasoning. 
 In order for a piece of information to be relevant for assessing causality, it must 
incorporate a variable, or factor, that may contribute to the true explanation.  When trying to 
ascertain if Joe is an extravert or an introvert, one could ask if Joe enjoys social gatherings.  In 
this case, “enjoyment of social gatherings” is a factor.  (Since socializing is positively associated 
with extraversion, requesting this information would be an example of reasoning framed in a 
“positive test strategy” (Klayman & Ha, 1987) – if Joe is an extravert, then he likes parties)  
Sometimes, a factor can function as an alternative explanation.  If the target explanation for the 
decline of a rare lizard population is global warming, and an individual asks if there has been 
recent human interference in the lizard’s habitat, then “human interference” is both a factor and a 
generated, genuine alternate explanation.  When factors are relevant to assessing any 
explanation, we categorize them into one or more of the following three non-mutually exclusive 
kinds of information. 
Causal Mechanism.  Information on causal mechanism provides the “how” in a logical 
line of argument.  In the hypothesis that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, the factor that 
links smoking and cancer together (namely, the mutagenic effects of toxins found in cigarettes 
on lung cells) would function as a causal mechanism.  However, in the hypothesis that unhealthy 
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behaviors lead to lung cancer, cigarette smoking, which links maladaptive behavior with cancer, 
could be considered a causal mechanism.  In other words, a causal mechanism is any cause on a 
causal pathway that is more proximal to the effect than the explanation.  Therefore, because an 
individual must self-generate the link between a proposed cause and the effect, causal 
mechanism must arise from a priori knowledge of information related to an explanation.  An 
individual’s prior experience limits the ways in which he or she evaluates an explanation; 
identifying mechanism allows for the treatment of covariation evidence as an explanation rather 
than noise, making the hypothesis more plausible (Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995).   For 
example, most people know that the flu, which is most prevalent in the winter months, is not 
transmitted by cold weather (one covariation) but by contact with people who are already 
infected (another covariation).  Individuals’ prior experience allows them to understand that 
there is no good mechanism for the cold weather hypothesis, but knowledge about viruses leads 
to the establishment of a feasible mechanism for the human contact explanation.  The literature 
also shows that the attribution of higher plausibility to a hypothesis will influence the rigor with 
which the hypothesis is tested (Schunn & Klahr, 1993).   
Corollary Event.  Explanations do not stand alone, but rather exist and are evaluated 
within an array of related information (Koslowski, 1996).  It is possible that, in certain instances 
when individuals request evidence for an explanation, they are attempting to find consistencies 
between the evidence and something that they believe to be true about the world.  In our 
experiment, these beliefs came from the participant’s prior understanding of natural and social 
phenomena.  For example, when testing global warming as the explanation for lizard population 
decline, a participant might ask for evidence about methane in the atmosphere.  The participant is 
introducing a new factor that is based on his or her belief about the role of atmospheric methane 
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in global warming.  Roughly, the participant is thinking: if global warming is at fault, then their 
hypothesis would be supported if methane was present in the atmosphere.  Therefore, this 
participant has brought in a corollary event. 
 Contrast or Covariation Test. A contrastive test compares information from distinct data 
points, such as between times or populations; it asks, “Is there a difference?”  A covariation test 
explicitly examines if the difference is associated with the event to be explained.  These tests are 
akin to those in conventional, constrained causal reasoning tasks, such as when flipping one of 
two switches turns on a light bulb; both are tests of direct covariation.  However, because our 
causal reasoning task is complex and more ecologically valid, involving infinite potentially 
contributing variables, covariation tests in this study can strengthen or weaken the plausibility of 
an explanation but never determine causality.   
Nevertheless, due to the important distinction between a test and its possible results, 
contrast and covariation tests are valuable when attempting to distinguish between explanations.  
When the variable being tested must necessarily correlate with the event in order for an 
explanation to be true, if there is not a correlation, then the explanation cannot be true.  For 
example, in testing the hypothesis that increased predator population has led to a decline in 
lizards, if 1) the contrastive test between predator populations before and after lizard decline 
shows that there was no increase in predator, or 2) the covariation test of a relationship between 
change in predator population and lizard decline is not significant, then the predator increase 
explanation is undermined.  In our evaluation of tests generated by participants, we considered 
both possible results – positive and negative – in order to determine if the test could potentially 
distinguish between two explanations. 
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Hypotheses 
 Our evaluation approached spontaneous generation of potentially distinguishing 
hypothesis tests from two angles.  We asked which types of explanation are most linked to the 
ability to request information that could result in distinguishing evidence.  When individuals are 
able to generate distinguishing tests, they should be more likely to introduce factors from a 
network of related information.  Therefore, we also asked if participants who are able to 
distinguish use causal mechanism, corollary events, and contrast/covariation tests differentially 
than those who fail to distinguish.  We employed the following hypotheses: 
 
 H1: The ability to generate distinguishing information will differ based on the origin 
(self- or other-generated) and the number (zero, one, or two) of evaluated explanations.  
 
 H2: When people generate distinguishing information, they are more likely to use causal 
mechanism, corollary event, and/or covariation tests than when they fail to generate 
distinguishing information. 
 
 
Methods 
Participants 
 Sixty participants (female = 33), ages ranging from 18 years to 22 years, were recruited 
on a Northeast American university campus.  Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: No Explanation 
Present (NE), Self-Generated Explanation Present (SGE), One Explanation Provided (1Exp), and 
Two Explanations Provided (2Exp).  (The data presented in this study are part of a larger sample, 
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which will be analyzed in its entirety in future research.)  Instructions for protocol assembly and 
random assignment to condition by gender are included in Appendix A.   
 
Materials 
 Story Problems.  Six story problems from the natural and the social sciences were 
constructed.  From the natural sciences: 1) Why the platypus population is declining; 2) Why 
only one particular species of tree would die while other species in the same area were not 
affected; 3) How the species of grape that is used to make European wines is flourishing in 
Europe when it experienced a devastating parasite infestation in 1900.  From the social sciences: 
4) Why homelessness skyrocketed in the 1990’s; 5) How the entire population of an ancient city 
could vanish; 6) Why hard-to-place adopted children are more successful in homes with same-
sex rather than opposite-sex parents.   
Using a table of random numbers, the protocols were grouped into three pairs.  Each pair 
included one story from the social sciences and one from the natural sciences: 1) Platypus and 
Cities; 2) Grapes and Adoption; 3) Trees and Homelessness.  Story problem order was 
randomized within protocol pair.  Each subject was presented with one protocol pair, thereby 
completing the same condition twice, once for each story problem in the pair.   
 Explanations.  For each story problem, two possible explanations (Explanation A and 
Explanation B) were created by the experimenters.  Within story problems, we controlled for 
length and syntactical complexity of the explanations.  In both the 1Exp and 2Exp conditions, 
one of the experimenter’s explanations was presented as the target explanation (T).  In 2Exp 
only, the other explanation was presented as the alternate explanation (A).  In both conditions, 
we counterbalanced which explanation was presented as T as a between subjects variable.  In 
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order to establish a comparable target explanation in the NE and SGE conditions, participants 
were asked to generate what they believed to be the most plausible explanation.  In SGE, they 
generated the target explanation directly after presentation of the story problem.  In NE, which is 
conceptualized as the “unprompted” condition, participants generated the target explanation at 
the end of the interview so that they did not focus on any particular explanation at the outset of 
the study.  All stimuli for each story problem are included in Appendix B. 
 
Design 
 The between-subjects variables were age, sex, protocol pair, condition (NE, SGE, 1Exp, 
or 2Exp), and presented target hypothesis (in 1Exp and 2Exp).  The within-subjects variable was 
story problem.   
This study is based on a sub-set of a larger data collection in which 24 participants (12 
males and 12 females) were randomly assigned to each condition for a total of 96 participants.  
In the 1Exp and 2Exp conditions, half of the subjects (6 males and 6 females) received 
Explanation A as the target explanation in both story problems, and the other half received 
Explanation B as the target.  The first 60 participants to complete the task for the larger data 
collection are included in this study.  Out of these participants, there were 15 in NE, 14 in SGE, 
16 in 1Exp, and 15 in 2Exp. 
 
Procedure 
The semi-structured interview was conducted by trained experimenters who obtained 
informed consent at the outset of the study.  Then the interview protocol was placed in front of 
both the interviewer and the participant so the participant could follow along visually while the 
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interviewer read through the stimuli.  (Before encountering any story problems, all participants 
were provided instructions on recording emotionality on the Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & 
Mendelsohn, 1989), which would be presented to them at points throughout the interview.  
Participants were asked to use the Grid to report the arousal and valence of their emotionality 
based on provided information.  Although the Affect Grid is often treated as a focal experimental 
measure, we include it in order to establish that our stimuli do not engender an emotional 
response.  We found this grid to be appropriate in its measure of both the nature and intensity of 
emotion, as well as practical in its brevity and clarity.  However, for the purposes of simplicity 
and straightforwardness in this study, we have not included analyses of the emotion measure; 
results on emotionality will be analyzed in a future study.) 
After completing the instructions, the experimenter read through the entire protocol while 
the subject followed along silently.  The structure of the interview protocol varied among the 
four conditions.  Examples of information presented and questions asked in each of the 
conditions are available in Appendix C.  Table 1 outlines the protocol construction of each of the 
four conditions.  Every protocol consisted of three major sections (listed in bold type in Table 1): 
story problem, target explanation, and information seeking.  In every condition, participants were 
presented with the story problem in the first section.  In the SGE, 1Exp, and 2Exp conditions, the 
target explanation was identified (either provided or generated) directly after the story problem.  
In the NE condition, as previously discussed, the target explanation was identified at the end of 
the protocol in order to preclude having participants focus on particular explanation at the outset 
of the task.   Additionally, in every condition, participants were asked to describe what 
information they would seek in order to better evaluate the story problem (in NE) or the target 
explanation (in SGE, 1Exp, and 2Exp).  Generation of responses stopped when participants 
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indicated that they would not seek any other evidence.  After generating all of the requested 
information, participants were then asked to rate each piece of information that they generated on 
a seven-point scale of usefulness in understanding the story problem.  Finally, they were asked to 
explain their ratings.  At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed. 
 
 
Table 1. Interview arrangement for NE, SGE, 1Ex, and 2Ex conditions.   
No Explanation (NE)  Self-Generated 
Explanation (SGE)  
One Explanation (1Ex)  Two Explanation (2Ex)  
• Story problem 
• Information seeking 
• Usefulness ratings 
• Identify most plausible 
explanation (use as T) 
• Affect Grid for T 
• Plausibility rating for T 
• Story problem 
• Identify most plausible 
explanation (use as T) 
• Affect Grid for T 
• Plausibility rating for T 
• Information seeking 
• Usefulness ratings 
• Story problem 
• Target explanation 
• Affect Grid for T 
• Plausibility rating for T 
• Information seeking 
• Usefulness ratings 
• Story problem 
• Target explanation 
• Affect Grid for T 
• Plausibility rating for T 
• Alternate explanation 
• Plausibility rating for A 
• Information seeking 
• Usefulness ratings 
 
 
Experimenters recorded responses on the protocol pages, taking detailed notes of the 
participant’s answers to open-ended questions.  Non-directive prompts (such as, “Can you tell 
me more?” and, “Anything else?”) were used to elicit clarity of participant response.  Qualitative 
variables were categorically coded according to the schematics included in Appendix D.  Each 
piece of evidence generated by each participant for both story problems was evaluated for all of 
the following variables: 
• Distinguishes Between Target and a Genuine Alternative (GenuAlt) – The information 
requested could, depending on the results, distinguish a target from an alterative 
explanation that includes specifically defined factors.  The genuine alternative could be 
either generated by the participant or provided by the experimenter (in the 2Exp 
condition).   
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• Distinguishes Between Target and a Complementary Alternative (CompAlt) – The 
information requested could, depending on the results, distinguish a target from its 
complementary alternative, but participant does not provide a genuine alternative 
explanation. 
• Does Not Distinguish (NoDisting) – Regardless of the results, the requested information 
could not distinguish between the two explanations in question.  Often, the information 
could increase or decrease the plausibility of one or more explanations, but would not 
completely disconfirm one explanation. 
• Causal Mechanism (CM) – The requested information addresses a causal factor that is 
more proximal to the effect than the explanation being evaluated; in other words the 
responses include some information about the mechanism that mediates between a cause 
and its effect. 
• Corollary Event – The requested information is consistent with something that the 
participant holds to be true about the world, such as evolution or a particular economic 
theory. 
• Contrast or Covariation Test – In the requested information, the participant proposes 
either a contrastive or a covariation test of specific factors, including time trends and 
group comparisons.  An important note for coding is that a contrast or covariation test 
must be explicitly stated; if a participant simply sought the presence or absence of a 
factor, even though the results of that search could potentially distinguish between 
alternatives, there is no contrast or covariation test generated.  Cue words for a test are 
“before” and “after,” “associates with.”  The test could be either empirical (by proposing 
an intervention) or observational.   
 
 The three types of distinguishing responses (GenuAlt, CompAlt, and NoDisting) are 
mutually exclusive; each piece of evidence was coded as only one of these three variables.  The 
three types of factors (CM, corollary event, and contrast/covariation test) are not mutually 
exclusive; each piece of requested information could be coded for any combination (or none) of 
these three variables.  The relationships between these variables are similar to how, for any 
person, gender is a mutually exclusive variable, but both genders can be coded for hair color, eye 
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color, and height.  Throughout coding, we erred on the side of caution; we judged explanations, 
factors, and tests at face value, coding only based on what the participants explicitly said.   
 
Results 
Controlling for Confounding Variables 
  There was no significant effect of gender or target explanation on tendency to distinguish 
between any kinds of explanations at the .05 significance level.  Differences in failure to 
distinguish (NoDisting) and distinguishing between the target explanation and a complementary 
alternative (CompAlt) were not significant between protocol pairs (alpha = .05).  However, 
generating evidence that could distinguish between the target and a genuine alternative 
(GenuAlt) does differ between protocol pairs, F (2, 57) = 4.27, p = .019, alpha = .05.  Because 
an approximately equal number of each of the protocol pairs per condition is included in 
analysis, we did not control statistically for the effect of protocol pair.  Future analyses will 
implement such a control. 
 
Verbal Fluency 
 For each subject, we computed the average number of pieces of information requested 
(verbal fluency) across the two story problems.  The continuous variable was reduced to a 
categorical variable because the distribution was not normal.  The frequencies of verbosity levels 
by condition are listed in Table 2.  Verbal fluency differed significantly by condition, χ2 (1, 30) = 
47.30, p = .023.  As Table 2 indicates, there were no subjects who generated above five pieces of 
information in SGE, 1Exp, and 2Exp.  The maximum amount of information generated declined 
as we moved from NE to SGE, 1Exp, and 2Exp.  Large numbers of responses are more likely to 
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occur in NE than in other conditions; NE promotes higher verbal fluency.  Verbal fluency did not 
differ by gender or by protocol pair at the .05 significance level.   
 
 
Table 2.  Frequency of verbal fluency level by condition.   
Average Count of Information Requests  
1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50 6.00 6.50 Total 
Condition NE 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 1 15 
 SGE 2 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 14 
 1Exp 2 1 1 9 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 16 
 2Exp 2 4 2 1 3 3   0 0 0 0 0 15 
Total  7 9 5 13 4 10 4 2 4 1 1 60 
 
 
Analysis for Hypotheses 
 H1.  Our first question was, are individuals better able to generate tests that could 
distinguish between hypotheses in certain conditions?  Across the subjects in this sample, only 
four subjects failed to consider at least one genuine or complementary alternative.  In future 
analyses, we will eliminate these subjects in order to reduce the noise from responses that are 
irrelevant to assessing explanations.  In the present analysis, these subjects were included.    
For the first analysis, for each participant, we computed the percentage of the total 
number of responses in each condition that distinguished between two explanations.  This 
percentage was computed separately for distinguishing genuine alternatives, distinguishing 
complementary alternatives, and failing to distinguish altogether.  The means (with standard 
deviations in parentheses) for the percentage of pieces of evidence generated by each participant 
in those three groups across condition, respectively, were 13.09 (18.51), 19.67 (22.29), and 67. 
24  (26.94).  The distribution of each type of distinguishing response by condition is shown in 
Figure 1.  For NoDisting, an ANOVA found an effect of condition, F(3, 56) = 3.77, p = .02.  A 
follow-up with Fisher’s LSD tests showed that NE was significantly different than both SGE and 
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2Exp, p = .02.  For CompAlt, an ANOVA also found an effect of condition, F(3, 56) = 8.63, p < 
.001.  Follow-up LSD tests showed a significant difference between NE and 2Exp, between SGE 
and 2Exp, and between 1Exp and 2Exp, p < .001.  For GenuAlt, however, the difference between 
conditions was not statistically significant at an alpha value of .05.  In summary, condition 
affected tendency to distinguish between the target and a complementary explanation, as well as 
between the target and a genuine alternative. 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Types of Distinguishing Responses by Condition – Mean (SD). 
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H2.  Our second question was, when individuals do generate distinguishing tests, are they 
more likely to use causal mechanism, corollary events, and contrast/covariation tests than when 
they fail to distinguish?   
Incorporating causal mechanism (CM) (M = 9.57, SD = 14.03) and distinguishing 
between the target explanation and a genuine alternative (GenuAlt) (M = 13.09, SD = 18.51) was 
moderately positively correlated, r(58) = .257, p = .048.  Including a corollary event (M = 57.59, 
SD = 25.40) and GenuAlt was also moderately positively correlated, r(58) = .268, p = .038.  
Using a contrast/covariation test was not significantly correlated with GenuAlt at an alpha value 
of .05.   
 Incorporating a contrast/covariation test (M = 35.83, SD = 28.57) and distinguishing 
between the target explanation and a complementary alternative (CompAlt) (M = 19.97, SD = 
22.29) were strongly positively correlated, r(58) = .682, p < .001.    Use of neither CM nor a 
corollary event were correlated with CompAlt (alpha = .05). 
 Failure to distinguish between two hypotheses (NoDisting) (M = 67.24, SD = 26.94) was 
strongly negatively correlated with use of a contrast/covariation test, r(58) = -.718, p < .001.  
NoDisting was not correlated with the use of either CM or a corollary event (alpha = .05). 
 To further examine the relationship between distinguishing and using causal mechanism, 
a corollary event, or a contrast/covariation test, we created the categorical variables 
“Distinguish” (generated any distinguishing response, between the target and either a 
complementary or a genuine alternative) and “Fail to Distinguish” (never generated a 
distinguishing response).  The average percentage of participants in Distinguish who used a 
contrast/covariation test was 42.83 (SD = 26.74).  The average percentage of participants in Fail 
to Distinguish who used a contrast/covariation test was 7.83 (SD = 15.92). The difference in 
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contrast/covariation test use between those who distinguished and those who did not was 
statistically significant, F(1, 58) = 18.73, p < .001.  Figure 2 displays the differences in test use 
between failure and success at distinguishing.  Use of neither causal mechanism nor corollary 
event differed based on ability to distinguish (alpha = .05). 
 
Figure 2. Incorporation of Contrast/Covariation Test by Ability to Distinguish 
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Discussion 
 
Verbal Fluency 
 We asked participants to identify what information they would like to have in order to 
better evaluate either the story problem (in the NE condition) or the target explanation (in SGE, 
1Exp, and 2Exp).  Because we put no restriction on the number of responses that a participant 
could generate, participants were able to think out loud and cognitively pump out the maximum 
number of pieces of evidence that they would seek.  The average number of responses (or verbal 
fluency), therefore, represents the “range of thought” permitted by each condition.  Verbal 
fluency decreased as we moved from the no explanation condition to the self-generated 
explanation, one explanation provided, and two explanation provided conditions; the variables in 
each condition differentially constrained the possible range of thought.  In each successive 
condition, the experimenter provided more information to participants, from no explanation, to a 
self-generated explanation, to one explanation, to two explanations.  It appears that, as more 
information was presented to participants, they were able to focus more within the boundaries of 
that information, and they therefore generated less tangential information on their own.   
The NE condition did not prime the participant to focus on one particular explanation 
while generating responses, which led to unconstrained thinking and the broadest possible range 
of responses.  Conversely, the other three conditions prompted the participant to focus on one or 
more specific explanations, which seems to have limited the range of thought used in response 
generation.  In conjunction with verbal fluency, assessing the content of the responses is vital for 
determining if the thought constraint is beneficial or detrimental to scientific reasoning.  If 
participants generated fewer responses in the three other conditions but discriminated between 
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explanations better than they do in NE, then the high verbal fluency in NE can be attributed to 
generating responses that are an accumulation of information about the story problem, rather 
than evidence for determining the correctness of a causal factor.  For example, if increased 
predator population is the target explanation for lizard decline, asking about the lizard’s habitat 
would only yield additional information about the story problem, but would not help distinguish 
between possible explanations. 
 
First Hypothesis 
 We investigated how the different conditions would influence ability to request 
information that could, in principle, distinguish between two possible explanations.  In the no 
explanation condition, participants generated non-distinguishing responses significantly more 
often than they did in the self-generated explanation condition or the condition with two 
explanations provided.  Suppose that a participant was generating information to evaluate the 
explanation the pollutants in the soil were responsible for lizard population decline.  A non-
distinguishing response can be composed of one of three kinds of information: 1) Information 
about the story problem that is not related to any explanation (“What kind of soil do they live 
on?”), 2) The generation of an alternative explanation without an attempt to test it (“Were the 
lizards hunted by humans?”), or 3) a proposed test of a covariate that could not yield 
distinguishing results (“Are there more factories producing industrial waste now than before the 
population decline?” – Even if this contrastive test showed no difference, pollutants could have 
originated from a different source, so pollution as a general explanation cannot be ruled out).  
We can conclude that, with a higher percentage of non-distinguishing evidence and a higher 
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verbal fluency, participants in the NE condition were spending much more time generating one 
of these three types of information, rather than successfully seeking distinguishing evidence.   
A converging study showed that participants in NE spontaneously generated more 
genuine alternatives overall (Rush, 2007).  It appears that an unrestricted range of thought leads 
to the spontaneous generation of more possible alternatives, but that those alternatives are rarely 
effectively tested and distinguished.  On the other hand, in the 2Exp condition, where verbal 
fluency is the lowest, both the fewest genuine alternatives were spontaneously generated and a 
significantly lower percentage of non-distinguishing evidence was generated than in NE.  The 
2Exp condition also showed a significantly higher percentage of responses that distinguished 
between the target explanation and its complement than in any other condition.  The literature 
varies in its definition of confirmation bias; some hold that people do not consider alternative 
explanations; others claim that people are just bad at looking for evidence that distinguishes 
between explanations.  Our results suggest that, depending on the amount of information 
provided by the experimenter, those two measures of reasoning have an inverse relationship.   
It is seemingly counterintuitive that, in a condition where a participant is directly 
presented with an alternative explanation and where he or she spends more time generating 
potentially distinguishing tests than other kinds of information, participants seldom distinguish 
between the target and any genuine alternative.  To understand this result, we must consider what 
our operational definitions of “GenuAlt” and “CompAlt” imply about target and alternative 
explanations.  Because our study incorporates a target explanation that is designed to be 
dominant in the participant’s thoughts, we discuss distinguishing evidence as discriminating 
between the target and another explanation, either a genuine or a complementary alternative.  It 
is highly unlikely that the results of a test could both conclusively disconfirm one hypothesis and 
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explicitly confirm another genuine alternative – rather, undermining or ruling out one 
explanation would make the remaining alternative explanations slightly more plausible.  When 
an individual is said to have distinguished between the target explanation and a genuine 
alternative (GenuAlt), what has actually happened is the individual has developed a test that 
could result in evidence that undermines the genuine alternative.  If the information were to 
undermine only the target explanation, it would not explicitly support any particular genuine 
alternative (hence the use of the non-specific complement).  Therefore, when an individual 
distinguishes between the target explanation and its complement, he or she has actually 
generated information that could simply undermine the target.  This distinction allows for a new 
perspective on hypothesis testing: concentration on one hypothesis at a time. 
In the 2Exp condition, where individuals are the most likely to distinguish between the 
target explanation and its complement, they are in fact focusing on undermining only the target 
explanation.  Rush found that participants generate the fewest spontaneous explanations in this 
condition.  It seems that the presence of a provided genuine alternative diminished the need to 
spend time on generating additional alternatives, and the individual could focus on developing 
good tests of the target explanation.  The study instructions directed the participant to “determine 
if the [target] explanation is the correct one.”  The results imply that individuals were the most 
able to follow those instructions in the 2Exp condition.  In a future, similarly constructed 
condition, subjects will be asked to assess which of the two explanations (target or alternative) is 
correct to see if participants will perform differently under different instructions. 
 The SGE and 1Exp conditions did not show differences in any type of ability to 
distinguish.  Koehler (Koehler & Harvey, 2004) maintains that individuals should test other-
generated hypotheses more rigorously because there is no mental assessment of plausibility prior 
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to the selection of that hypothesis.  We find that participants generate information to undermine 
the self-generated target in SGE and the other-generated target in 1Exp equally often.  Because 
participants are asked to think out loud and articulate all pieces of information that they would 
seek to evaluate the target explanation, it is likely that participants are verbally reiterating the 
mental assessment of the plausibility of alternatives that they made prior to selecting their target 
explanation.  While participants may generate more alternative explanations in the SGE 
condition than in 1Exp (Rush, 2007), which is consistent with Koehler’s findings, the origin of 
the target explanation does not appear to affect its testing. 
 
Second Hypothesis 
 The results from analysis of the first hypothesis demonstrate that it is very difficult to 
generate evidence that could successfully distinguish between two explanations; the majority of 
responses in every condition did not ask for distinguishing evidence.  One reason that 
distinguishing is so challenging may be that individuals do not have enough background 
information on a topic (Ahn et al., 1995).  If this idea is correct, then the use of more background 
information should correspond to more distinguishing evidence.  Thus, for our second 
hypothesis, we asked about what factors in a response make distinguishing between explanations 
easier.  Causal mechanism, corollary events, and contrast/covariation tests are indeed employed 
differentially depending on the ability of a response to distinguish between explanations.  Our 
breakdown of the implications of distinguishing between a target hypothesis and either a genuine 
or a complementary alternative helps to clarify the results on the use of these factors. 
 When an individual distinguishes between the target and a genuine alternative, 
conceptually, he or she has identified evidence that undermines the alternative explanation.  
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Undermining an alternative would require either finding the results of a covariation test that are 
inconsistent with the explanation, or finding that the explanation is not consistent with any 
background information.  Consistent with our hypothesis, the incorporation of both causal 
mechanism and corollary events are associated with the ability to distinguish between target and 
alternative.  However, the use of a contrast or covariation test does not correlate with the ability 
to generate distinguishing evidence.  Possibly, because individuals consider alternative 
explanations in light of the target explanations (by nature of the term “alternative”), and may 
have already considered possible mechanism for the target, they need the same kind of 
background information about alternatives in order to be able to compare the two explanations 
for plausibility.  Future studies should investigate the seeking of causal mechanism and corollary 
events for both target and alternative hypotheses, and the order in which participants ask for 
these pieces of information.  If individuals require comparable background information in order 
to be able to distinguish between two genuine explanations, then information on background 
information for the alternative should be requested after background information on the target. 
 Distinguishing between a target and a complementary alternative is equivalent to 
generating evidence that undermines the target explanation.  The results for the use of 
background information and covariation tests in undermining the target are the inverse of the 
results for undermining a genuine alternative presented above.  The use of contrast or covariation 
tests is highly correlated with ability to distinguish, while the incorporation of both causal 
mechanism and corollary events is unrelated to distinguishing.  One possible reason for the 
strong correlation with covariation test is that, in the target explanations, certain factors were 
already present and available for the participant to test for covariation.  Testing those factors 
required less cognitive exertion than generating an alternative hypothesis with its own factors to 
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test.  In future analyses, we will investigate the origin of the factors used in each piece of 
requested information in relation to its ability to distinguish between explanations.  Furthermore, 
because these factors are on hand for the participant to test, running covariation tests may have 
been chosen over finding mechanism or corollary events, which would again require more 
mental effort.  To control for information provided by the experimenter, a future study could 
provide participants with both causal mechanism and covariates for an event and evaluate which 
set of factors they use more frequently when distinguishing. 
 There was also a strong negative correlation between failure to distinguish between 
hypotheses and use of contrast and covariation test; as the use of a test increases, failure 
decreases.  Additionally, the difference in use of a contrast or covariation test between those who 
successfully distinguished between any two explanations and those who failed to distinguish was 
statistically significant.  Causal mechanism and corollary event use was unrelated to failure to 
distinguish.  It appears that the best predictor of avoiding a confirmation bias is the incorporation 
of a contrastive or covariation test.  While it may be that, without access to any background 
information that would make causality likely, individuals have difficulty evaluating explanations 
(Kuhn et al., 1988), in causal reasoning situations that are more ecologically valid and inherently 
involve access to relevant background knowledge, tests of covariation seem to be the preferred 
method of distinguishing between explanations.   
 
Conclusion  
Theory delineates the range of evidence that we consider plausibly causal for an event, 
and bridges the gaps between background knowledge, a possible distal cause, and the event.  
From theory, we can generate distinguishing hypothesis tests, a crucial component to the 
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scientific method.  Although complete adherence to a theory can cause trouble, such as when we 
infer causation from mere covariation or engage in confirmation bias, theory helps us to 
efficiently categorize covariations as either potentially causal or only artifact.  In evaluating 
explanations for causal events, theory plays a fundamental role in good reasoning for both 
scientists and non-scientists.   
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Appendix A 
Protocol Assembly Schematic 
Four Conditions 
1) No Explanation (NE) 
2) Self-Generated Explanation (SGE) 
3) One Explanation (1Exp) Provided  
4) Two Explanations (2Exp) Provided 
 
Six Story Problems:  Platypus, Trees, Grapes, Homelessness, Cities, Adoption. 
 Æ In condition 1Exp-A, the target explanation is Explanation A. 
 Æ In condition 1Exp-B, the target explanation is Explanation B. 
 Æ In condition 2Exp-A, Explanaiton A is target and Explanation B is alternative. 
 Æ In condition 2Exp-B, Explanation B is target and Explanation A is alternative. 
 
Three Protocol Pairs: 
Platypus and Cities 
Grapes and Adoption 
Trees and Homelessness 
 
No Explanation (SGE) Condition 
Target Explanation Males Females Total 
No explanation 
provided  
4 copies of each pair 
= 12 protocols 
4 copies of each pair 
= 12 protocols 
8 copies of each 
pair, half for M, half 
for F 
= 24 protocols 
 
Self-Generated Explanation (SGE) Condition 
Target Explanation Males Females Total 
No explanation 
provided  
4 copies of each pair 
= 12 protocols 
4 copies of each pair 
= 12 protocols 
8 copies of each 
pair, half for M, half 
for F 
= 24 protocols 
 
One Explanation Provided (1Exp) Condition 
Target Explanation Males Females Total 
Explanation A 2 copies of each pair 
= 6 protocols 
2 copies of each pair 
= 6 protocols 
4 copies of each 
pair, half for M, half 
for F, = 12 protocols 
Explanation B 2 copies of each pair 
= 6 protocols 
2 copies of each pair 
= 6 protocols 
4 copies of each 
pair, half for M, half 
for F, = 12 protocols 
          = 24 protocols 
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Two Explanations Provided (2Exp) Condition 
Target Explanation Males Females Total 
Explanation A 
(Explanation B as 
alternative) 
2 copies of each pair 
= 6 protocols 
2 copies of each pair 
= 6 protocols 
4 copies of each 
pair, half for M, half 
for F, = 12 protocols 
Explantion B 
(Explanation A as 
alternative) 
2 copies of each pair 
= 6 protocols 
2 copies of each pair 
= 6 protocols 
4 copies of each 
pair, half for M, half 
for F, = 12 protocols 
          = 24 protocols 
 
Î 24 protocols x 4 conditions = 96 total protocols 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN EXPLANATIONS 37 
Appendix B 
 
Story Problems with Explanations 
Events and explanations from each of these stories were inserted into the protocol design 
in Appendix C. 
 
 
Platypus 
 
Event to be explained 
The platypus, an animal that lives in Australian waters, is a mammal that nevertheless 
lays eggs.  In recent years, the platypus population has suffered a sharp decline.  What 
might account for the decrease in the platypus population? 
 
Explanation A 
Environmental pollutants have introduced toxins into the water, killing many platypuses.   
 
Explanation B 
There has been an increase in the population of lizards that prey on platypus eggs. 
 
 
 
Trees 
 
Event to be explained 
In the coastal regions of Eastern Asia, some species of deciduous trees are steadily dying 
out while others are still living. What might explain this difference? 
 
Explanation A 
Due to global warming, certain deciduous trees that grow in altitudes that are normally 
cooler are unable to adapt to the slight increase in temperatures.   
 
Explanation B 
Introduction of an invasive type of fungus that affects specific species of deciduous trees 
resulted in a differential decrease in deciduous tree population. 
 
 
 
Grapes 
 
Event to be explained 
Varieties of vinifera, a European grape species, are the fruit involved in making European 
wines.  At the end of the 19th century, most of the European vinifera plants died due to a 
parasite infestation.  How are vinifera vines still thriving today? 
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Explanation A 
A small number of vinifera vines had natural resistance to parasites, and those vines were 
selectively bred by winemakers and used to repopulate the vineyards over time. 
 
Explanation B 
Winemakers graft the fruit-bearing parts of vinifera vines onto rootstocks of a grape 
species that is resistant to the parasite, and the vines continue to produce vinifera grapes. 
 
 
 
Homelessness 
 
Event to be explained 
In the mid-90’s, the rate of homelessness in the US suddenly skyrocketed.  Before the 
sharp increase, the level of homelessness remained relatively constant.  What might 
explain this sudden increase? 
 
Explanation A 
Because of an economic recession in the 90’s, many businesses engaged in massive 
layoffs.  Many people in the lower socioeconomic brackets who lost their jobs could no 
longer afford to pay rent or make mortgage payments. 
 
Explanation B 
In the 90’s, the federal government reduced funding for outpatient services for people 
with mental illnesses.  Many patients were left with little clinical supervision and stopped 
taking their medications, making it difficult to maintain a stable life. 
 
 
 
Cities 
 
Event to be explained 
In several locations scattered throughout the world, archeologists have discovered 
prehistoric cities that had been abandoned very suddenly by entire populations.  What 
might explain the sudden abandonment of these ancient cities?   
 
Explanation A 
The cities experienced sudden, major changes in climate, which forced inhabitants to 
move to locations that had better climates. 
 
Explanation B 
The cities were invaded by enemy groups that killed the populations and plundered the 
cities before they moved on.   
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Adoption 
 
Event to be explained 
In the process of adoption, hard-to-place children are usually characterized by behavior 
problems (such as aggression) and/or infant drug addiction from addicted birth mothers.  
These children are more likely to have mental and physical problems later in life.  
However, hard-to-place children who are adopted by same-sex couples tend to do better 
later in life than hard-to-place children adopted by opposite-sex couples.  What is the 
explanation for this improvement? 
 
Explanation A 
Same-sex couples are more committed to being parents, so they are more likely to 
provide environments that allow their children to overcome the obstacles of their 
adoptions.  
 
Explanation B 
Because of the obstacles to adoption faced by same-sex couples, they are often older at 
the time of adoption.  Thus, they are able to provide more stable lives for their adopted 
children. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Protocol Design 
 
At the outset of the study, after giving informed consent, participants were given the 
following instructions about reporting on the emotion diagram: 
 
Instructions for Emotion Diagram 
 
At certain points in this interview, you will be asked to rate your emotional reaction on a 
chart.  The chart includes multiple kinds and levels of emotions, including neutral 
emotion.   
 
For example, if you have no particular emotional reaction, you will record your reaction 
in the center box (which means “neutral”).  
 
If you do have an emotional reaction, such as being moderately happy and excited, you 
will record your reaction in the following box: 
 
Anger/Stress/Anxiety                 High Arousal                          Joy/Excitement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unpleasantness Pleasantness 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sadness/Depression                                  Sleepiness                   Contentment/ 
                     Relaxation  
 
         
         
       X  
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Using the platypus story as an example, protocols in each of the four conditions had the 
following formats: 
 
 
No Explanation (NE) Condition 
 
 
Event to be explained: 
 
The platypus, an animal that lives in Australian waters, is a mammal that nevertheless 
lays eggs.  In recent years, the platypus population has suffered a sharp decline.  What 
might account for the decrease in the platypus population? 
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Sometimes hearing stories about things causes you to feel certain emotions, and 
sometimes it just leaves you feeling neutral.  How does this event make you feel?  
 
Anger/Stress/Anxiety                 High Arousal                          Joy/Excitement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unpleasantness Pleasantness 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sadness/Depression                                  Sleepiness                   Contentment/ 
                     Relaxation  
 
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN EXPLANATIONS 43 
If you were trying to explain this event, what sort of information would you like to have 
to help you explain it?  Imagine you had a very efficient research assistant.  What sorts of 
information would you like your assistant to collect? 
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You’ve suggested several pieces of information that might help you explain this event.   
 
When people make suggestions, they often suggest some things that will be very useful 
and some that will be less useful.   
 
Please rate how useful you think each piece of information will be.   
 
Please also tell me why you chose each rating.   
 
 
       1                 2                 3                   4                  5                    6                    7 
Not at all               As Useful                Completely 
  Useful                 As Not                    Useful 
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Self-Generated Explanation (SGE) Condition 
 
 
Event to be explained: 
 
The platypus, an animal that lives in Australian waters, is a mammal that nevertheless 
lays eggs.  In recent years, the platypus population has suffered a sharp decline.  What 
might account for the decrease in the platypus population? 
 
 
What do you think the most plausible explanation is for this event?   
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Sometimes explanations for events make you feel certain emotions, and sometimes they 
just leave you feeling neutral.  How does this explanation make you feel? 
 
Anger/Stress/Anxiety                 High Arousal                          Joy/Excitement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unpleasantness Pleasantness 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sadness/Depression                                  Sleepiness                   Contentment/ 
                     Relaxation  
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How would you rate how plausible this explanation is?   
 
Why did you choose this rating? 
 
 
       1                 2                 3                   4                  5                    6                    7 
 
Not at all                       As plausible                Completely 
plausible                as not                               plausible 
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Once any explanation is proposed, it needs to be evaluated to see how likely it is to be 
correct.  How would you evaluate this explanation?  What sort of information would you 
like to have to help you decide whether it’s likely to be correct?  Imagine you had a very 
efficient research assistant.  What sorts of information would you like your assistant to 
gather? 
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You’ve suggested several pieces of information that might help you evaluate this 
explanation.   
 
When people make suggestions, they often suggest some things that will be very useful 
and some that will be less useful.   
 
Please rate how useful you think each piece of information will be.   
 
Please also tell me why you chose each rating.   
 
       1                 2                 3                   4                  5                    6                    7 
 
Not at all               As Useful                Completely 
  Useful                 As Not                    Useful 
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One Explanation Provided (1Exp) Condition 
 
 
Event to be explained: 
 
The platypus, an animal that lives in Australian waters, is a mammal that nevertheless 
lays eggs.  In recent years, the platypus population has suffered a sharp decline.  What 
might account for the decrease in the platypus population? 
 
 
Possible explanation: 
 
Environmental pollutants have introduced toxins into the water, killing many platypuses.   
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Sometimes explanations for events make you feel certain emotions, and sometimes they 
just leave you feeling neutral.  How does this explanation make you feel? 
 
Anger/Stress/Anxiety                 High Arousal                          Joy/Excitement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unpleasantness Pleasantness 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sadness/Depression                                  Sleepiness                   Contentment/ 
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Sometimes possible explanations for an event are plausible and sometimes they are not.  
Using this scale, please rate how plausible you think this explanation is.   
 
Why did you choose this rating? 
 
 
       1                 2                 3                   4                  5                    6                    7 
 
Not at all                       As plausible                Completely 
plausible                as not                               plausible 
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Once any explanation is proposed, it needs to be evaluated to see how likely it is to be 
correct.  How would you evaluate this explanation?  What sort of information would you 
like to have to help you decide whether it’s likely to be correct?  Imagine you had a very 
efficient research assistant.  What sorts of information would you like your assistant to 
gather? 
 
 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN EXPLANATIONS 54 
You’ve suggested several pieces of information that might help you evaluate this 
explanation.   
 
When people make suggestions, they often suggest some things that will be very useful 
and some that will be less useful.   
 
Please rate how useful you think each piece of information will be.   
 
Please also tell me why you chose each rating.   
 
 
       1                 2                 3                   4                  5                    6                    7 
 
Not at all               As Useful                Completely 
  Useful                 As Not                    Useful 
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Two Explanations Presented (2Exp) Condition 
 
 
Event to be explained: 
 
The platypus, an animal that lives in Australian waters, is a mammal that nevertheless 
lays eggs.  In recent years, the platypus population has suffered a sharp decline.  What 
might account for the decrease in the platypus population? 
 
One possible explanation: 
Environmental pollutants have introduced toxins into the water, killing many platypuses.   
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Sometimes explanations for events make you feel certain emotions, and sometimes they 
just leave you feeling neutral.  How does this explanation make you feel? 
 
Anger/Stress/Anxiety                 High Arousal                          Joy/Excitement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unpleasantness Pleasantness 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sadness/Depression                                  Sleepiness                   Contentment/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sometimes possible explanations for an event are plausible and sometimes they are not.  
Using this scale, please rate how plausible you find the first explanation.   
   
Why did you choose this rating? 
 
 
       1                 2                 3                   4                  5                    6                    7 
 
Not at all                       As plausible                Completely 
plausible                as not                               plausible 
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Another possible explanation: 
 
There has been an increase in the population of lizards that prey on platypus eggs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How plausible do you find the second explanation?   
 
Why did you choose this rating? 
 
 
       1                 2                 3                   4                  5                    6                    7 
 
Not at all                       As plausible                Completely 
plausible                as not                               plausible 
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Once any explanation is proposed, it needs to be evaluated to see how likely it is to be 
correct.  How would you evaluate the first explanation?  What sort of information would 
you like to have to help you decide whether it’s likely to be correct?  Imagine you had a 
very efficient research assistant.  What sorts of information would you like your assistant 
to gather?   
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You’ve suggested several pieces of information that might help you evaluate this 
explanation.   
 
When people make suggestions, they often suggest some things that will be very useful 
and some that will be less useful.   
 
Please rate how useful you think each piece of information will be.   
 
Please also tell me why you chose each rating.   
 
 
       1                 2                 3                   4                  5                    6                    7 
 
Not at all               As Useful                Completely 
  Useful                 As Not                    Useful 
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Appendix D 
Coding and Entering Schematic 
Column Name Code Instructions 
Subject# # Subject Number 
Gender 1 Female 
 2 Male 
Condition # Condition number (1, 2, 3, 4) 
Targ AorB 1 Target is Explanation A 
 2 Target is Explanation B 
Story# # Story problem number, 1-6 
T Plaus # Target plausibility rating 
EmoRise # Y-axis valence on emotion grid 
EmoRun # X-axis valence on emotion grid 
A Plaus # Alternate plausibility rating 
Evidence# # Order in which they state evidence 
Usefulness # Evidence usefulness rating 
Alternate1 0 Does not include alternative 
 1 Genuine alternative 
 2 Modification/combination 
 3 Complimentary (general) alternative 
 4 Explanation proposed becomes target (Condition 1) 
 5 Includes A (Condition 4 only) 
CM 0 Does not address causal mechanism 
 1 Addresses causal mechanism 
CorEvent 0 Not corollary event 
 1 Involves corollary event 
CV Test2 0 Does not propose a contrast /covariation test 
 1 Proposes contrast/covariation test of T 
 2 Proposes contrast/covariation test of any alternative 
Distinguish3 0 Does not distinguish 
 1 Distinguishes btw. T and a genuine alternative 
 2 Distinguishes btw. T and a mod./comb. of T 
 3 Distinguishes btw. T and a compliment of T 
 4 No alternative specified (implied compliment) 
 5 Distinguishes between T and A (Condition 4 only) 
 
                                                 
1 “Genuine alternative,” “Modification/combination,” and “Includes A” were combined for this study as “Genuine 
alternative.” 
2 For this study, “Proposes a contrast/covariation test of T” and “Proposes a contrast/covariation test of any 
alternative” were combined into “Proposes a contrast/covariation test.” 
3 “Distinguish btw. T and a genuine alternative,” “Distinguishes btw. T and a mod./comb. of T,” and “Distingiushes 
btw. T and A” were combined for this study into “Distinguishes between T and a genuine alternative.”   
“Distinguishes btw. T and a compliment of T” and “No alternative specified (implied compliment)” were combined 
for this study into “Distinguishes btw. T and a compliment of T.” 
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